



DFG Research Unit 2569 FORLand, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 









arkets – Efficiency and R
egulation 
 
Farmland Values and  
Bidder Behavior in  
First-Price Land Auctions 
 
Carsten Croonenbroeck,  
Martin Odening, Silke Hüttel 
 
FORLand-Working Paper 02 (2018) 
 
 
Farmland Values and Bidder Behavior in  
First-Price Land Auctions 
Carsten Croonenbroeck ∗, Martin Odening ∗∗, Silke Hüttel ∗∗∗ 
February 2018 
Abstract 
Within this paper, we aim to investigate asymmetries among bidders in land auctions that may entail 
non-competitive prices. Using representative data for Eastern Germany including winning bids, 
bidder characteristics, and land amenities, we pursue a structural approach to derive distributions 
of latent land values for different bidder groups. By applying nonparametric techniques, we cannot 
find evidence for asymmetric bidder structures while differentiating between legal entities, tenancy 
status, and nationality of bidders. Our findings challenge the hypothesis that land privatization via 
auctions discriminates against certain buyer groups—an argument that is often used to justify 
stricter regulation of agricultural land markets. 
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1 Introduction 
Land ownership rights are often transferred by auctions, given the virtue of the auction mechanism 
to allocate land efficiently. Consensus exists that land market auctions yield higher sales prices in 
comparison to search markets due to higher transparency and competitive pressure among buyers 
(e.g., Chow, Hafalir, and Yavas 2015, or Bulow and Klemperer 1996). The auction mechanism 
appears particularly attractive if land is sold by public purse, and for this reason many Eastern 
European countries with a history of economic transition and land reforms privatize or redistribute 
land via first-price sealed bid auctions (Hartvigsen 2014). Since 1997, it has even become 
obligatory—in line with European Union (EU) law—to rule out any publicly allotted allowances from 
the market mechanism if the public hand acts as a seller (Official Journal of the European Union 
No. C 209).  
Efficiency in the sense of maximizing revenues from land sales or allotting land to owners with the 
highest willingness to pay is not the only objective that land markets should pursue, at least from a 
policy perspective. Policy makers and other stakeholders are also interested in a “sound” 
distribution of land property rights, a prevention of dominant market positions and a diversity of 
legal forms and production systems. As a matter of fact, the share of farmland owned by farmers is 
constantly decreasing in most developed economies (e.g., Deininger et al. 2011). Though usually 
associated with developing countries, land-grabbing has been shown by van der Ploeg, Franco, 
and Borras (2015) to occur on a broad scale in the global north and the EU as well. Not surprisingly, 
a heated policy debate has emerged regarding whether land markets in their present state can 
actually cope with these issues in a satisfactory way or whether regulations should be tightened 
(Kay, Peuch, and Franco 2015). Sometimes the debate about land market regulations, particularly 
regarding ownership restrictions, is embedded in more general discussions on how sustainable 
agriculture should be organized (e.g., Brady et al. 2017). Proponents of small-scale, family-based, 
and regional agricultural production are concerned about the possible economic dominance of 
large-scale, potentially industrialized agricultural structures. To ensure viability of the former, these 
groups often propose allowing privileged access to land markets or restricting ownership (see e.g., 
Lawley (2018), who investigates the land ownership restriction act in Canada). In the EU, various 
measures have been proposed and in some member states already imposed to achieve the 
aforementioned objectives, for example, giving priority to farmers in the case of land purchases or 
relieving young farmers’ access to land by facilitating farm succession and start-ups. At the same 
time, the restriction of market access for agents treating land as an investment asset without 
possessing any farming interests (so-called non-agricultural or financial investors) is being debated, 
even though this is not in line with EU treaties.1  
Against this background, it is desirable to understand whether using land auctions as specific 
market institutions facilitate the aforementioned policy goals, or if the resulting land allocation favors 
or discriminates certain farm types in terms of their legal form, their size, or the provenance of the 
bidders. For example, are large scale industrialized farms more successful in acquiring land from 
auctions than small family farms, or do foreign investors offer systematically higher bids than 
domestic farmers? Nevertheless, why should bids and hence valuations of land systematically differ 
                                               
1  A detailed analysis of newly-established land market regulations to ensure limited access to investors 
(both foreign and domestic) in the group of Eastern European Member States can be found in Ciaian et 
al. (2017). 
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among bidder groups? Clearly, these differences should be related to expected income streams 
generated by farmland investments. One might argue that larger farms generate higher incomes 
while benefiting from economies of scale. Likewise, non-agricultural investors may face lower 
financial constraints compared with farmers, and thus lower costs of capital. Local farms and farm-
investors might, however, be better informed about the potential income generated from the land, 
which could possibly lead to different (higher or lower) valuation for given land characteristics (e.g., 
soil quality) compared to non-farm investors. Local farmers instead of bidding for land to use it and 
not with the intention to rent it out, might have a higher willingness to pay (WTP), particularly if it 
comes to auctions for land that is already under their usage, or for a parcel surrounded by own 
parcels without any infrastructure to access the land. In the latter case, high transaction costs for 
disentangling the field and further losses besides using the field area such as increased production 
costs might increase the WTP of farms compared to investors. Even collusion between local 
farmers might be possible, which comes even at a disadvantage to non-farm investors, possibly 
leading to lower prices. This phenomenon has been reported to affect equilibrium prices in auctions 
(Banerji and Meenakshi 2004), though thus far not in the land markets context. 
Whether these arguments are valid or not in reality is an empirical question. Unfortunately, there is 
only sparse empirical evidence on the dominance of certain buyer groups in land auctions. Hüttel 
et al. (2013) show that realized land prices are higher in land auctions in Eastern Germany when 
the share of agricultural bidders is low. Yet, higher land prices could likewise be realized if the 
winning bidder was a resident with knowledge about local land development plans and 
infrastructure. Curtiss et al. (2013) report higher prices if investors are involved in the transaction, 
particularly in transition economies in which market entry is not highly regulated.  
With this paper, we aim to analyze whether buyer groups differ systematically in their valuation 
distributions leading to different bidding behavior in land auctions. Knowledge about buyer 
asymmetries is relevant for two reasons. First, one can verify whether bidders representing certain 
farm types are dominant and have the potential for crowding out competitors, which would 
undermine the aforementioned diversity goal, at least on a local scale. Second, bidder asymmetries 
may entail market inefficiencies with non-competitive prices (Klemperer 1999). As such, first price 
auctions might then not lead to an efficient allocation of the land. That is, the land will not be in the 
hand of those with the highest valuation. The reason is that weakness of bidders leads to a more 
aggressive bidding strategy that may even prevent other bidders from participating, and the final 
winning bids are not fully competitive anymore. Moreover, the revenue equivalence principle no 
longer holds under asymmetry, and the question arises regarding which auction format will 
maximize sellers’ profits. 
To identify potential bidders asymmetries in land auctions, we use a comprehensive data set from 
the land privatizing agency in Eastern Germany (Bodenverwertungs- und -verwaltungs GmbH; 
BVVG), over the period 2007–2015. The BVVG sells land in first-price sealed bid auctions with 
public tenders. We analyze these auction data using a structural estimation approach, which relies 
on the hypothesis that the observed bids are the equilibrium bids of the auction model considered, 
in our case a first price sealed bid auction (c.f. Paarsch and Hong 2006).2 At equilibrium, a bidder’s 
strategy maps the private valuation of the item into a bid. Structural estimation of auction data 
(SEAD) targets recovering the (unobserved) distribution of the bidders’ valuations from the 
                                               
2  Overviews on structural estimation of auction data are provided by Perrigne and Vuong (1999) or 
Hickman, Hubbard, and Sağlam (2012). 
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observed distribution of bids. That is, the aim is to investigate the data-generating process directly 
(Hendricks and Porter 2007). Therefore, the structure of the auction is used to map the theoretical 
equilibrium bid functions and their distribution into econometric models. Hence, the probability law 
of the valuations of potential bidders, that is, the primitives of the underlying theoretical auction 
model, can be identified (Perrigne and Vuong 1999). Reduced form models used as an alternative 
approach to analyzing auction data basically include auction-specific variables such as the number 
of bidders or the bidder type, into a hedonic price regression rather than using the equilibrium bids 
as a mapping from observed bids to unobserved bidder valuations (Hong and Shum 2000). Thus, 
reduced form models can only provide the average mark up in bids possibly attributed to a specific 
bidder group, which would not be sufficient for our research question. Another advantage of SEAD 
is that the theoretical auction model imposes restrictions that can be tested, such as monotonously 
increasing bid functions or a markdown of valuations in first-price sealed bid auctions. Hence, 
theoretical results serve as a basis for testing the validity of the auction model under consideration, 
which is crucial since any data would otherwise support the price data (Athey and Haile 2007).  
In our empirical analysis, we explore asymmetries within three pairs of bidder groups in land 
auctions in Eastern Germany. Based on a rich data set, we classify the groups by their legal form, 
their tenancy status, and the involvement of foreign investors, respectively. Regarding legal status, 
we differentiate between natural persons (single farms, private partnerships) and legal entities (co-
operatives, limited liability companies, and joint stock companies). The distinction between natural 
persons and legal entities is more than a formal one. While corporations and cooperatives are in 
most cases direct successors of the formerly agricultural cooperatives of the GDR, newly 
established and re-established family farms were typically founded as natural persons. 3  In a 
simplistic manner, these two groups represent opposed principles of organizing agricultural 
production. Legal entities stand for industrialized agriculture; they are, on average, much larger 
than single farms, employ foreign workers, and operate with a larger share of leased land. In 
contrast, natural persons are smaller in size, centered around a family (a household) and typically 
strive to transfer the farm to the next generation.  
The distinction between former tenants and other bidders is motivated by informational gains that 
the former group may have when bidding for land. Practical experiences that former tenants have 
gained facilitate a realistic and more precise valuation of the tendered land plots. It is, however, 
unclear if former tenants submit systematically higher bids than their competitors do. The third 
classification aims to identify land speculators. Though we cannot clearly measure the motivations 
that drive bidders in land auctions, it seems very likely that speculation is an important motivation 
if foreigners are involved in the buyer consortium. Thus, it is interesting to test whether (local) 
farmers’ willingness to pay for land is lower compared to foreign investors. Our findings do not 
support asymmetric structures and thus challenge the hypothesis that land privatization via auctions 
discriminates certain buyer groups and the argument to justify stricter regulation of agricultural land 
markets. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. We start with presenting the background of the 
land privatization process and the auction design in Eastern Germany. In the next section, we 
describe the data and provide descriptive evidence on potential asymmetric bidder structures. In 
the subsequent section, we outline the theoretical framework, the independent private value model 
from which we derive optimal bidding strategies for asymmetric bidders. Next, we detail our 
                                               
3  German Democratic Republic, today Eastern Germany from October 3rd, 1990, onwards. 
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empirical strategy, including the empirical identification of the model and the non-parametric 
estimation of the distribution of land valuations. In the following section, we discuss our empirical 
results, and in the final section, we present conclusions. 
2 Background: Privatization and Land Auctions in Eastern Germany  
In Eastern Germany, the legal foundation of land reform after 1989 was comprised of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Law (Landwirtschaftsanpassungsgesetz), the Law Governing Unsolved 
Property Issues (Gesetz zur Regelung offener Vermögensfragen), and the Reunification Treaty 
(Einheitsvertrag). For about 55% of the agricultural and forest land, ownership rights were restituted 
without the involvement of Germany’s privatization agencies. Former owners who had been 
expropriated between 1945 and 1949 were not restituted, although they were potentially eligible; 
this included other citizens of the GDR involved in the agricultural sector (Hartvigsen 2014). As a 
direct successor of the federal privatization agency (Treuhandanstalt, founded in 1990), in 1992 the 
BVVG (Bodenverwertungs- und –verwaltungs GmbH) was founded with the target of privatizing the 
agricultural and forest land over a longer period. Until claims for restitution were decided, BVVG 
rented out the land based on long-term lease contracts in the first years. One major reason here 
was the uncertainty and the wish to avoid a large-scale privatization, where price drops in the land 
market were expected. Based on the Land Purchase Program (1994) and the Privatization 
Principles (Privatisierungsgrundsätze) since 2007, where our data set starts, land is either directly 
sold to eligible persons (“Direktvergabe”) at a “fair” market value, which typically refers to a local 
reference value (“Vergleichspreissystem”), or sold by public authorities through tenders (first-price 
sealed bid auctions) with public calls. These transactions make up a considerable local market 
share. To illustrate their local importance, in Saxony-Anhalt for instance, BVVG had a market share 
of roughly 20% in the period from 1995 to 2010 (BVVG 2010). BVVG’s privatization practice, that 
is, selling the land on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Finance, but also the respective German 
privatization policies in general have been criticized as major contributors to soaring land prices 
(Wolz 2013). In particular, possibly higher prices realized within auctions compared to those from 
negotiated sales as shown by (e.g., Fluck, John, and Ravid 2007) have been used as an argument 
to question the auction mechanism as being optimal for privatization by the public purse. As a 
response, and in order to increase market transparency, BVVG regularly publishes achieved prices 
and some basic lot characteristics such as type of land and region on their website.4  
Auctions are typically used by many post-communist countries to privatize formerly state-owned 
land (c.f. Hartvigsen 2014) as, for instance, recommended in earlier studies (e.g., Braun 1998) as 
a prerequisite for a successful economic transition.5 Whether the auction mechanism really ensures 
market efficiency, whether inefficient ownership structures occur because of asymmetric buyer 
structures, and whether such ownership structures go along with policy aims of a favorable farming 
structure have to the best of our knowledge not been analyzed thus far. More recent studies rather 
examine the implications of lagging privatization and deal mainly with the role of investors in land 
markets, often labeled as “land grabbing” (e.g., Visser and Spoor 2011; Kerven et al. 2016). Also in 
Eastern Germany, non-farmers’ and investors’ market participation has been critically debated. In 
this regard, BVVG’s activities in publishing the auctions’ results, which was originally intended to 
                                               
4  See http://www.bvvg.de/INTERNET/internet.nsf/HTMLST/SERVICE (in German, last accessed Nov-5th, 
2017). 
5  Comprehensive overviews about transition-related land reforms and other privatization challenges in 
post-communist countries can be found, for instance, in Lerman, Csáki, and Feder (2004). Also, an 
excellent brief overview is given by Sedik and Lerman (2008). 
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improve market transparency, were often used as arguments for why BVVG auctions in particular 
contribute to soaring prices in Eastern Germany. Given that these land auctions are generally open, 
it is often conjectured that because of the published auction results, market entry might be eased; 
particularly non-agricultural buyers motivated by capital investments in times of low interest rates 
might be attracted. Soaring auction prices due to increased competition could then be interpreted 
by the market in general as an indicator of positive future price developments (Tse, Pretorius, and 
Chau 2011). First empirical investigations support this argumentation (e.g., Hüttel, Wildermann, and 
Croonenbroeck 2016). Empirical evidence, however, still lags behind because of the difficulty of 
identifying a “non-agricultural buyer” or “investor” not directly related to the local farming business, 
but also because of the heterogeneity of this group regarding their scale of investment, regional 
involvement, and the origin of their capital (cf. Tietz, Forstner, and Weingarten 2013).  
In the auction literature a considerably different size of the bidders (Laffont, Ossard, and Vuong 
1995) or differences in capacity constraints (Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer 2003), both of which 
result in differences in financial limits, have been reported to lead to asymmetric bidder structures. 
Different levels and quality of information also foster potential asymmetries in bidder structures 
(Hendricks and Porter 1992; Hendricks, Porter, and Wilson 1994). These arguments all hold for the 
land market. Land may be acquired with intentions to simply farm it, but also to enlarge equity or to 
grow. The latter argument also holds for larger agribusiness firms or GDR-LPG-successors.6 
Another intention may be to rent the land out as in the case of farmer investors, that is, treating the 
land as an investment asset. These intentions can be traced back to different types of buyers with 
different capital sources and financial restrictions. This observed asymmetry has often been used 
in debates over why particularly local and privately organized (and likely smaller) farms could be 
“priced out” of the market. Two facts, however, weaken this argumentation. First, even bidders 
within the group of farmer-bidders may naturally differ since land utilization options and potential 
benefits from scale economies remain farm-specific, as do productivity and cost structure. That is, 
within the farmer group we also observe asymmetries on potential bidders; unfortunately, our data 
set does not allow us to investigate this asymmetry. We can, however, distinguish by legal form, 
which allows us to investigate whether potential bidders with legal forms typically chosen by newly- 
and re-established farms (mainly privately organized) value land differently than potential bidders 
from the group of legal entities and cooperatives, typical forms of (larger) successor-farms.  
Second, while potential returns from using the land might strongly depend on the type of land, it is 
the final productivity and managerial ability of the user that generates profits from the land. As such, 
farmer bidders can rely on experience and may be better informed, particularly if it comes to former 
tenants of the lot or BVVG. Local and experienced farms may also be better informed regarding 
transaction costs, for instance in case of not winning the auction (losing the land), as well as 
revenue losses from losing production capacity. These costs may involve mapping the auctioned 
plot from a potentially larger lot under usage, but also to ensure access some infrastructure (paths, 
roads) might need to be (re-)established. Such asymmetries have often been reported in transition-
related land markets, where this may even lead to bargaining power of the buyer (e.g., Curtiss et 
al. 2013). We will investigate this kind of asymmetry by using observed tenancy status (i.e., the 
buyer was a former tenant at BVVG or not) and whether a foreigner obtains the winning bid, which 
we use as an indication for investment activities.  
                                               
6  The acronym LPG stands for Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaft, that is, an agricultural 
cooperative that was a typical farming organization in the German Democratic Republic. 
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The direction of effects, however, is not that clear in advance. Informational asymmetry might trigger 
or compensate for differences in the cost structure and financial restrictions. For instance, a credit-
constrained farm with better information might have a higher valuation compared to non-
constrained investors or larger firms; this farm might not participate in the auction even though the 
estimate of future returns for this farm might be higher. It could also be that anticipating potentially 
stronger bidders in the auction, for instance without financial limitations or larger firms with 
considerable benefits from scale economies, the perceived weaker bidder might bid more 
aggressively to compensate for disadvantages (Flambard and Perrigne 2006). As a result, it is 
possible that market outcomes will be inefficient, that is, the bidder with the highest valuation will 
not win, and the auction results are then neither competitive nor do they result in equilibrium prices. 
This may in turn lead to wrong market signals. 
Another related question is whether the resulting distribution (independent of the efficiency 
question) meets policy perspectives, visions, and aims regarding ownership and farming structure. 
The BVVG sells on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Finance with the aim to privatize efficiently. The 
Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture and other stakeholder groups in the farming lobby, 
however, typically state visions regarding a diverse ownership and farming structure, and target at 
fostering local farmers. Within this debate, investors’ participation and market asymmetries were 
often used as arguments for proposing intense regulation in Germany, for example ownership 
restrictions or eligibility for participation in these auctions to ensure diverse ownership structures. 
However, empirical evidence thus far is lacking. In order to investigate empirically whether and how 
asymmetric bidder structures possibly dominate these land auctions, a differentiation between 
potential buyers by investors (local, domestic, and foreigners) and farmers would not suffice. The 
first step must be to investigate whether systematic differences between different buyer groups in 
these land auctions exist.  
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data set at hand covers all BVVG auctions from January 3, 2007 to July 17, 2015 for all eastern 
federal states of Germany. We exclude transactions where churches, municipalities, and others 
such as non-profit organizations were involved since these are uninformative for our questions (in 
sum, 455 transactions were excluded in this step), while tenders with only forest, recreation, and 
areas for natural reserve were already excluded by BVVG. From these remaining 12,250 
transactions, we consider only competitive ones, that is, with at least two bidders. Excluding 
incomplete observations, BVVG identified outliers, and those with only minor holdings or building 
land (arable and grassland amounts to zero) provides the final sample with 9,781 observations that 
are rather uniformly distributed by the years (see table A1 in the appendix). 
For each transaction the winning bid, the total number of bidders, the exact date of the auction, as 
well as the location, land characteristics (plot-specific) including a soil quality index7 , lot size, 
number of parcels, and type of usage are available. The average winning bid, that is, the average 
                                               
7  The soil quality index (points) refers to an official index in Germany constructed to unify pedologic, 
scientific, and (agro-)economic considerations within one measure for arable land (“Ackerzahl”) and 
grassland (“Grünlandzahl”). These values range across Germany, where the lowest measured value is 7 
and the highest ever measured value is 104. In our data set both are available, though to ease the 
analysis of mixed lots, we unify these measures into one and assign the shares of the respective land 
type on the total lot size as weights. The higher the index is, the higher is the quality of the land and the 
higher is the potential yield from using the land.  
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price of all plots gathered in one transaction, amounts to 1.18 Euros per square meter over the 
entire period. Transaction prices range from 0.03 to 9.51 Euros, which suggests a significant 
heterogeneity of the auctioned lots. Average size is about 8.34 hectares, with a maximum of 631.6 
hectares (see table A2 in the appendix for descriptive information of transaction shares). The share 
of arable land ranges from zero to one, though with more than 50% at the mean. Most important 
for our research question (the analysis of bidder asymmetries) the data set contains bidder 
characteristics that allow us to differentiate by legal status, whether the buyer was a former tenant 
(not necessarily on the same plot) and whether a foreigner was involved in the buyer consortium. 
Tables 1-3 display descriptive statistics for these bidder groups. 
Cooperatives win in 9% of the transactions considered, incorporated enterprises win in 22% of the 
transactions, and civil law associations together with single firms are victorious in 68% of the 
transactions. In terms of auctioned area, the relation changes slightly: corporations and 
cooperatives buy 34% of the land while single firms and partnerships buy 64%. Auctioned lots of 
legal entities are, on average, larger (9.498 versus 7.566 hectares) though they also involve a 
higher number of parcels. Interestingly, the number of bids is around 4 in both groups while the 
average distance is larger in the group of natural persons (see table 1).  
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Winning Bids by Legal Status 
Legal entities (2,916 transactions) 
 Mean Std. dev. Skewness 
Winning bid [Euros per m2] 1.206 0.802 1.809 
Number of bids per transaction 3.949 2.442 2.524 
Distance buyer to plot [km] 24.814 82.851 4.788 
Lot size [hectare] 9.498 20.779 13.278 
Share arable land [0,1] 0.650 0.393 -0.720 
Average soil quality index 42.200 16.506 1.179 
Number of parcels 7.922 13.220 7.853 
 
Natural persons and private partnerships (6,417 transactions) 
 Mean Std. dev. Skewness 
Winning bid [Euros per m2] 1.168 0.853 1.851 
Number of bids per transaction 4.017 2.451 2.344 
Distance buyer to plot [km] 80.945 145.665 1.925 
Lot size [ha] 7.566 19.769 19.069 
Share arable land [0,1] 0.538 0.439 -0.214 
Average soil quality index 41.470 15.694 1.135 
Number of parcels 5.226 8.478 8.676 
Source: BVVG 2007-2015. 
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Second, we consider differences between groups by using the information whether the buyer was 
former tenant of BVVG. Over the period studied, former tenants won 27% of the auctions, though 
not necessarily of the lot being auctioned. This sums up to a share of 30% of the auctioned land 
(table 2).  
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Winning Bids by Tenant Status 
Non-tenants (7,021 transactions)  
 Mean Std. dev. Skewness 
Winning bid [Euros per m2] 1.201 0.873 1.870 
Number of bids per transaction 4.062 2.513 2.399 
Distance buyer to plot [km] 75.270 141.838 2.127 
Lot size [hectare] 8.043 21.854 17.697 
Share arable land [0,1] 0.553 0.437 -0.277 
Average soil quality index 41.659 15.848 1.129 
Number of parcels 5.469 9.340 10.919 
 
Former tenants (2,663 transactions) 
 Mean Std. dev. Skewness 
Winning bid [Euros per m2] 1.130 0.752 1.661 
Number of bids per transaction 3.828 2.247 2.240 
Distance buyer to plot [km] 30.915 88.875 3.378 
Lot size [hectare] 9.108 19.769 14.222 
Share arable land [0,1] 0.614 0.403 -0.566 
Average soil quality index 41.718 16.017 1.201 
Number of parcels 7.643 12.071 5.541 
Source: BVVG 2007-2015. 
Table 3 reveals that our sample contains 99 transactions with international bidders (1% of the cases 
and the land auctioned). Foreigners (or in participation) have, however, bought on average, larger 
lots, though also with a larger number of parcels at a comparable quality and a lower share of arable 
land compared to the other transactions. Potential asymmetries may in this case arise from 
differences in financial capacity, and potential constraints might be lower in the case of investors. 
As such, we would expect differences here, though the low number of observations by group might 
be a challenge.  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Winning Bids by Foreigner Involved 
Foreigners involved (99 transactions) 
 Mean Std. dev. Skewness 
Winning bid [Euros per m2] 1.080 0.642 5.392 
Number of bids per transaction 3.263 1.882 2.293 
Distance buyer to plot [km] 79.3758 85.170 0.215 
Lot size [hectare] 15.105 28.695 6.430 
Share arable land [0,1] 0.427 0.424 0.208 
Average soil quality index 36.530 11.308 0.484 
Number of parcels 8.232 20.741 8.162 
 
National buyers (9,582 transactions) 
 Mean Std. dev. Skewness 
Winning bid [Euros per m2] 1.183 0.844 1.766 
Number of bids per transaction 4.005 2.449 2.378 
Distance buyer to plot [km] 63.038 130.967 2.391 
Lot size [hectare] 8.266 21.207 17.210 
Share arable land [0,1] 0.572 0.429 -0.361 
Average soil quality index 41.728 15.926 1.148 
Number of parcels 6.044 10.043 8.429 
Source: BVVG 2007-2015. 
To get a first impression of potential asymmetries among these bidder groups, we proceed in two 
steps: first, we compare the distributions of the winning bids and second, we test for differences in 
hedonic price regressions as suggested by Flambard and Perrigne (2006). 
Inspecting the winning bid’s cumulative density functions, in case of asymmetries one group should 
first-order stochastically dominate the other. That is, the strong bidders (e.g., advantages in the cost 
structure) are more likely to win the auctions and should dominate the weak bidders (e.g., cost 
disadvantages lead to lower returns from owning the land). In panel a) of figure 1, the CDF of the 
winning bids (given in Euros per square meter) suggests some range where legal entities dominate. 
Similarly, we investigate whether the CDFs of the winning bids differ if a former tenant was involved 
in the transaction (see panel b) of figure 1) and whether a foreigner participated (see panel c) of 
figure 1). While nearly no difference can be observed in the lower range of the observed bids 
between tenants and non-tenants, in the upper range non-tenants seem to dominate. Comparing 
transactions where domestic bidders win with those where foreigners were part of the winning 
consortium, in the lower ranges no differences are visible, while in the upper range some 
dominance by domestic buyers could be observed. This contradicts the often-stated apprehension 
that foreign investors price farmers out of the market. However, given the heterogeneity of the 
tendered land plots and the considerable price impact of land characteristics, differences among 
bid distributions must be interpreted with caution.  
                                               
8  This information is only available for 5 transactions.  
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Figure 1: Cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of the winning bids in €/m²  
by a) legal form, b) tenancy status and c) foreigner participation 
  
a) Legal form b) Tenancy status 
 
 
c) Foreigner participation  
In a second step, we regress the log of winning bids on plot and auction characteristics, that is, lot 
size, soil quality, distance lot-buyer, number of bidders, and number of parcels, and include time 
dummy variables. We run these regressions separately for each bidder type except the distinction 
by foreigner participation because of the low number of observations. A Chow test reveals that the 
estimated coefficients for number of bids, distance, and soil quality, as well as dummy variables for 
2007, 2012, 2013, and 2015 differ significantly by natural persons and legal entities. This finding 
indicates that the valuation of land attributes differs among legal forms. Quality and dummy 
variables for 2008, 2013, and 2014 also differ when distinguishing between former tenants and non-
tenants. To verify these initial findings we proceed with investigating potential asymmetries using a 
structural approach for asymmetric bidder structures in first-price auctions. 
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4 Independent Private Values Auction Model with Asymmetric Bidders 
In this paper, we make use of the independent private value (IPV) paradigm. In the case of the land 
market under study, the valuation of land can be assumed to be private for each bidder. Private 
land values can be justified because bidders’ expected development of future income streams, 
either from using or renting out the land, depends on expected returns from farming but also on 
individual knowledge, ability, their overall net income flow, wealth status, as well as their time and 
risk preferences, which are all based on private information. This also holds for potential cost of not 
winning the auction that also remain private. In the case of renting out the land as potentially 
targeted by investors, the information on expected returns also depends on potential tenants’ 
behavior, in particular on their expectations, both of which remains private for the bidders. In 
contrast, a common value might exist because the real net present value of the land investment 
remains unobserved and land can be sold after the auction.9 Land investments are, however, 
typically long-term investments with the intention to store and increase either wealth or a production 
base, and less likely with the intention to re-sell it. This argument is supported by the low overall 
mobility of farmland in Germany, where 0.7% of the total utilized agricultural area was transacted 
in 2015 (Destatis 2015). In addition, even though BVVG publishes the results of the auctions, the 
valuation can be argued to be private and independent because forming the bid is based on 
expected future returns of the land investment, and publishing might ease market entry and hence 
lead to increased competition, while information on how to estimate the returns will remain private. 
In the independent private values’ setting, 𝑛𝑛 bidders are assumed to be risk-neutral and compete 
for a plot of land with the goal to maximize utility, denoted by 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 = 𝑈𝑈(𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖). This function is assumed 
to increase in 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 , denoting bidder 𝑖𝑖 ’s private information. Under independent private values, 
environment uncertainty arises from the fact that the value for competing bidders is unknown. That 
is, the other bidders’ valuation remains uninformative for the bidder (e.g., Perrigne and Vuong 1999) 
and utility reduces to 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 = 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖. Each bidder is assumed to have an individual expectation of the value 
of the land, 𝑉𝑉, which can be interpreted as the present value of future returns from utilizing the land, 
or renting it out as would be the case for investors. The exact present value is typically unknown 
and hence 𝑉𝑉 is modelled as a random variable, with realizations 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 reflecting the valuations of the 
bidders. That is, bidders draw their private values independently from the common distribution 
function that reduces to 𝑛𝑛 dimensions in 𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉(𝑣𝑣) and density 𝑓𝑓𝑉𝑉(𝑣𝑣). For further details we refer to 
Milgrom and Weber (1982). 
The bidders are further assumed to estimate the relationship between their bid and the probability 
of winning the auction, and to behave incentive-compatible (bidder rationality). Since BVVG 
proceeds upon a non-binding reserve price, it follows that 𝑝𝑝0 = 𝑣𝑣, where 𝑣𝑣 denotes the lower bound 
of the distribution domain.  
Following the idea of incomplete information games under bidder symmetry, that is, ex ante, the 
bidders are identical and the equilibrium of the symmetric game will be restricted to be symmetric 
as well. That is, each bidder uses the same strategy 𝜎𝜎(∙) that maps each private value to the bid 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 
                                               
9  The common value environment is the other extreme in the auction literature to the independent private 
values framework. Under pure common values, the value of the auctioned item is the same for all bidders, 
though unknown to the bidder. Given the arguments presented in the text, a clear distinction in the land 
markets context is difficult and we cannot rule out that land markets might obey a common component or 
affiliated values. We argue that a common component would be more relevant if the intention to re-sell 
the land would be more pronounced in land markets, and as such continue using the IPV model.  
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directly returned from 𝜎𝜎(𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖). We define random variable 𝑆𝑆 with its realization 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 representing the bid. 
Since strategy 𝜎𝜎(∙) returns a bid and depends on the private value 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖, it follows that its inverse maps 
from the space of bids into the values such that 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 = 𝜎𝜎−1(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖). For 𝑛𝑛 ≥ 2, at the Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium each bidder chooses her bid to maximize expected profits with the equilibrium strategy 
as a unique solution of the following first-order differential equation:10 






subject to the boundary condition 𝜎𝜎(𝑣𝑣) = 𝑣𝑣 and the solution is given by  







While the symmetry assumption seems to constitute a reasonable starting point, we argue that the 
competitors among land within BVVG auctions are not ex ante identical per se. As indicated by the 
empirical assessment of the data set, we thus follow upon a more general model setup that allows 
us to acknowledge the asymmetries among bidders. Symbol 𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗  now denotes the number of 
potential bidders by type, with 𝑗𝑗 = 0,1 indicating the respective bidder group with 𝑛𝑛 = 𝑛𝑛0 + 𝑛𝑛1.  
Following the notation of Perrigne and Vuong (1999), group 1 could be better informed regarding 
usage possibilities of the land compared to subgroup 0 denoting all other bidders. Bidders of type 
1 draw independently from their private values distribution 𝐹𝐹1(∙) and bidders of type 0 from their 
distribution 𝐹𝐹0(∙) with 𝑭𝑭(∙, … ,∙) = 𝐹𝐹1
𝑛𝑛1(∙)𝐹𝐹0
𝑛𝑛0(∙).  
It is assumed that these distributions are common knowledge with a common support [𝑣𝑣, ?̅?𝑣]. The 
equilibrium strategies 𝜎𝜎1(∙) and 𝜎𝜎0(∙), respectively, are given by the following differential equations: 



















subject to boundary conditions 𝜎𝜎1�𝑣𝑣� = 𝜎𝜎0�𝑣𝑣� = 𝑣𝑣  and 𝜎𝜎1(?̅?𝑣) = 𝜎𝜎0(?̅?𝑣) . For existence and 
uniqueness of the equilibrium, we refer to Maskin and Riley (2000).  
Note that this system of differential equations is complex and intractable for simulation-based 
empirical investigation. Thus, we follow the indirect structural empirical approach introduced by 
Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000), which relies on non-parametric estimation techniques. 
Applying this empirical approach has the advantage that the equilibrium strategy does not need to 
be computed.  
                                               
10  For all these steps we refer to Krishna (2009). 
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5 Empirical Strategy: Structural Analysis of Land Auction Data 
In what follows, we first present the idea of non-parametric identification, followed by the estimation 
procedure.  
5.1 Non-Parametric Identification of the Asymmetric IPV Model  
Identification in the estimation of auction models can be reduced to the question of whether, for a 
given equilibrium, a bijective relationship exists between the unobserved distributions of the bidders’ 
valuations and the observed bids exists (Hendricks and Porter 2007). That is, the question is 
whether 𝐹𝐹1(∙), 𝐹𝐹0(∙), 𝑛𝑛0 and 𝑛𝑛1 can be identified from the observed bids and the number of actual 
bidders. The core assumption upon which non-parametric identification relies is that the observed 
winning bids are assumed to be the equilibrium bids, and the number of potential bidders is equal 
to the number of actual bidders.  
Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) provide the basic insight that bidders’ latent valuations can be 
expressed as a function of the bids and the joint distribution of competing bidders. Define 𝐺𝐺(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) =
𝐹𝐹 �𝜎𝜎0−1(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)� = 𝐹𝐹(𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖)  as the equilibrium distribution of the bids and 𝑔𝑔(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)  as the corresponding 
density, then substituting into the differential equation (3) yields 
𝑣𝑣1𝑖𝑖 = 𝜉𝜉1(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) ≡ 𝑠𝑠1𝑖𝑖 +
1
(𝑛𝑛1 − 1)𝑔𝑔1(𝑠𝑠1𝑖𝑖) 𝐺𝐺1(𝑠𝑠1𝑖𝑖) + 𝑛𝑛0 𝑔𝑔0(𝑠𝑠1𝑖𝑖) 𝐺𝐺0(𝑠𝑠1𝑖𝑖)⁄⁄
 
𝑣𝑣0𝑖𝑖 = 𝜉𝜉0(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) ≡ 𝑠𝑠0𝑖𝑖 +
1
𝑛𝑛1 𝑔𝑔1(𝑠𝑠0𝑖𝑖) 𝐺𝐺1(𝑠𝑠0𝑖𝑖)⁄ + (𝑛𝑛0 − 1)𝑔𝑔0(𝑠𝑠0𝑖𝑖) 𝐺𝐺0(𝑠𝑠0𝑖𝑖)⁄
. 
(4) 
Herein, 𝜉𝜉1 and 𝜉𝜉0 are the inverse bid functions that map bids into values. Since bids, bid distribution, 
bid densities, the number and the identity of bidders are observable, equation (4) enables the 
identification of latent private values. In fact, Laffont and Vuong (1996) show that the asymmetric 
IPV model is identified if the functions 𝜉𝜉1(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) and 𝜉𝜉0(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) are strictly increasing in the bids (𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖). The 
intuition is that 𝐹𝐹(∙) is identified from 𝐺𝐺(∙) since observed bids are linked to private values by a 
strictly increasing equilibrium strategy. 
(Athey and Haile 2002, 2116) assert that identifying the asymmetric IPV model is even possible 
from a single bid as long as the identity of the bidder is observed in first-price auctions. Since we 
observe the transaction price as well as the legal form of the winning bidder, his status as former 
tenant and his origin, our data set provides sufficient information to empirically identify the auction 
model and to assess potential asymmetries among bidder groups. 
5.2 Estimation procedure 
The nonparametric approach proposed by Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000), hereafter denoted 
by GPV, evaluates the sample analog of equation (4). The estimation proceeds in two steps: First, 
estimate the distributions 𝐺𝐺(∙)  and densities 𝑔𝑔(∙)  non-parametrically using kernel estimation. 
Second, based on equation (4) calculate pseudo valuations 𝑣𝑣�𝑖𝑖  and estimate the empirical 
distributions 𝐹𝐹�(𝑣𝑣) from these pseudo values. This approach, though data-intensive, exhibits two 
main advantages: it is computationally simple as no explicit expression of the optimal bid function 
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is required. Moreover, it avoids parametric assumptions about 𝐹𝐹 , which is convenient because 
theory offers little guidance on the functional form of the distributions of the valuations. In our 
application we have to take into account three peculiarities which require some modifications of the 
aforementioned procedure, namely missing information of the composition of bidders types in an 
individual auction, incomplete bid data, and heterogeneity of the sold land plots. In what follows, 
we discuss how we deal with these issues. 
Tables 1-3 reveal that the auctioned land plots are rather heterogeneous. Quality, size, and usage 
of the land (e.g., arable land or grassland) not only systematically differ by auction and group, 
though these strongly determine the usage possibilities and hence the productivity from the land 
and thus shape the bid. As shown by Athey and Haile (2002, 2117), the model is still identified and 
the GPV-approach can be extended to acknowledge each auction item to have different 
characteristics. To remove object heterogeneity, we follow (Athey and Haile 2007) and assume an 
additive structure of valuations 
𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  =  𝛤𝛤(𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖) +  𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (5) 
where 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 denotes the observed attributes of the auction 𝑡𝑡, 𝛤𝛤(∙) is a function to be estimated and 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
are bidder-specific private values. Haile, Hong, and Shum  demonstrate that additive separability is 
preserved in equilibrium. This allows us to control for the effect of covariates by running a regression 
in the sense of a hedonic approach of observed bids as 
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  = 𝛾𝛾 +  𝛤𝛤(𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖) + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (6) 
with constant term 𝛾𝛾 and error term 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. Here, we use a linear function 𝛤𝛤(∙). With estimates 𝛤𝛤�(𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖) at 
hand, homogenized bids 𝑠𝑠ℎ can be calculated as follows: 
s𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ  = 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝛤𝛤�(𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 − 𝑧𝑧̅) (7) 
where 𝑧𝑧̅ is the mean of all plot characteristics over all auction cases. That is, homogenized bids 
refer to a fictive land plot with average values of attributes. Homogenized bids replace actual bids 
in all subsequent estimation steps.  
Calculations of valuations via equation (4) requires information on the composition of bidder groups 
in an auction, that is, the number of potential bidders in each group 𝑛𝑛0 and 𝑛𝑛1 . Moreover, a 
sufficiently large number of auctions with the same absolute number of bidders is needed for a 
reliable nonparametric estimation of the bid distributions and densities. As Tables 1 through 3 
document, the number of bidders, and thus competitive pressure, varies considerably around an 
average value of about 4. We account for this in a way similar to the heterogeneity of land 
characteristics. That is, we include the number of bids in the hedonic regression equation (7) and 
calculate homogenized bids for an auction with an average number of bids, that is, 4. Then we 
impose the simplifying assumption that the relative size of bidder groups is the same for all auctions, 
and estimate the relative size by the share of won auctions. After rounding this leads to 𝑛𝑛0 = 3  for 
the group of natural persons, non-tenants and domestic buyers, respectively, while 𝑛𝑛1 = 1 for legal 
entities, former tenants, and foreign buyers, respectively. 
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Though all bids are observable in a first-price auction, only the winning bids 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 are available in our 
data set. Fortunately, Paarsch (1989) shows that even though 𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗(𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖) is nonlinear in 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖, it is possible 
to identify value distributions 𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉
𝑗𝑗(𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖) with its density 𝑓𝑓𝑣𝑣
𝑗𝑗(𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖) from winning bids 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗. Estimators for the 
distribution of winning bids, 𝐺𝐺𝑊𝑊
𝑗𝑗 (𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗), and density 𝑔𝑔𝑊𝑊
𝑗𝑗 (𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗), respectively, for both bidder groups are 
























with 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 as the number of auctions, ℎ denotes the bandwidth parameter and 𝑘𝑘 the kernel function. 
We use Epanechnikov kernels as these provide compact support. Optimal bandwidth selection is 
performed via cross-validation following Guidoum (2015); these are shown in table A4 in the 
appendix.  
The estimates of the distributions and densities of winning bids are then used to generate estimates 
of maximal valuations, 𝑉𝑉�𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 via equation (4). With these pseudo values at hand, we can estimate 
























In order to obtain an estimate of the empirical probability density function of 𝑣𝑣, we use numerically 
pointwise consistent gradients of 𝐹𝐹�𝑉𝑉















where 𝑊𝑊𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 and 𝑊𝑊𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 denote the lowest and highest observations of winning bids across 𝑡𝑡. From 
𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌
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These calculations are carried out for each pair of bidder groups, that is, legal versus natural 
persons, tenants versus non-tenants, and German versus foreign buyers. We finally compare the 
densities by buyer groups and test whether different bidder groups have different distributions of 
their valuations by pairwise two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov-tests (e.g., Marsaglia, Tsang, and 
Wang 2003; Chernomaz and Yoshimoto 2017).  
6 Results 
Before we turn to the final results of the SEAD model, that is, the bidder-specific distributions of 
land valuations, we present the results of the hedonic regression that are used to remove 
heterogeneity in the tendered land plots according to equation (6). The R2 of 0.919 documents that 
only little variability remains in the adjusted, homogenized bids (table A3). Moreover, the signs of 
the estimated coefficients are plausible and in line with other empirical studies about the impact of 
land attributes on land prices. As expected, land quality, the share of arable land, and plot size have 
a positive effect on the transaction price, while the number of plots have a negative impact. The 
year dummies reflect the steady increase of the general land price level observed in Germany 
between 2008 and 2015. The positive coefficient of the number of bidders confirms theoretical 
predictions for the IPV auction model. 
The estimated value distributions 𝐹𝐹�𝑉𝑉
𝑗𝑗(𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖) for each pair of the buyer groups are depicted in figure 2, 
while the summary statistics of the pseudo-values (table A5), their density plots (figure A1), as well 
as the CDFs of homogeneous winning bids (figure A2) are presented in the appendix. Comparing 
the distributions of winning bids (figure 1) and the distributions of the homogenized winning bids 
(figure A2) visualizes the effect of the bid adjustment (equation 7). The CDFs of homogenized bids 
are steeper and show less variability since they refer to a hypothetical land plot with average values 
of attributes. Moreover, contrasting the CDFs of homogenized winning bids and bidders’ valuations 
shows that the latter is dominated by the former, which is due to bid shading (eq. (4).11 
Turning to the bidder asymmetries with regard to the legal form of bidders, figure 2a shows that the 
value distribution of legal entities slightly dominates that one of natural persons over a large range 
of values. A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirms that the value distributions differ 
significantly at any level (p-value: 0.0000). The difference between the means of the CDFs, 
however, is rather small and amounts to 300 Euros per hectare, that is, a mark-up of about 2.6%. 
This finding may indicate that legal entities in eastern Germany yield higher marginal returns from 
utilizing land compared to natural persons. Higher returns may stem from benefits from size 
(economies of scale) since cooperatives are, on average, considerably larger than private (mainly 
family) farms. In 2014/15, the average size of legal entities was about 1,125 ha in eastern Germany 
while private farms classified as larger according to the Federal Ministry’s statistic used an average 
of 178 ha (Germany). Moreover, legal entities may face lower financial restrictions, which might 
also relate to the opportunities of investors’ participation. Particularly the legal form of a cooperative 
or corporate may offer such opportunities for investors. However, single farms and private persons’ 
partnerships draw from distributions with slightly lower valuations, and this group wins 74% of the 
auctions (64% of the auctioned land). Comparing homogenized winning bids and values for both 
groups reveals that natural persons bid a bit more aggressively, on average: the discount on 
valuations amounts to 1.3% compared with 0.9% for legal entities.  
                                               
11  The difference between winning bids and values appears rather small (about 1%). Note that bid shading 
is more pronounced since it refers to optimal bids, which are smaller than winning bids. 
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Figure 2: CDF of valuations in €/m²  
by a) legal form, b) tenancy status and c) foreigner participation 
  
a) Legal form b) Tenancy status 
 
 
c) Foreigners involved  
The distribution functions of valuations for former tenants and non-tenants displayed in figure 2b 
reveal that apart from the very left tail, both CDFs are strikingly similar. In fact, the p-value of two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test is 0.406, that is, we cannot reject the null that both distributions 
are identical. Accordingly, tenants and non-tenants seem to have the same valuation of land, where 
former tenants win in 28% of the cases (30% of the auctioned land in hectares). However, some 
caution is needed here. First, the groups of tenants and non-tenants are heterogeneous and can 
interfere with the classification according to legal form and farm size. Thus, asymmetries related to 
different causes may offset each other. Second, potential informational advantages of former 
tenants might be concealed in our analysis by removing land plot heterogeneity. Better-informed 
tenants will submit higher (lower) bids for plots that are undervalued (overvalued) by non-informed 
bidders. Our analysis cannot identify these effects since the “true” land value is unobserved.  
  
Carsten Croonenbroeck; Martin Odening; Silke Hüttel 
Farmland Values and Bidder Behavior in First-Price Land Auctions 
FORLand-Working Paper 02 (2018)   - 19 - 
Finally, we analyze whether bidders groups with foreign participation have a different valuation of 
land compared with domestic bidders. Figure 2c reveals that the often alleged dominance of foreign 
(financial) investors is not supported by our results. It even appears that domestic bidders assign 
higher values to land than foreign bidders below the 70% quantile. However, this deviation is not 
significant (p-value of K-S test: 0.362), a finding which can be attributed in part to the low number 
of auctions where foreigners are involved (99 cases). The result that domestic and foreign bidders’ 
private values are drawn from the same distribution does not necessarily imply that both groups 
face identical decision problems. It could also mean that potential advantages and disadvantages 
associated with a particular bidder type offset each other. On the one hand, foreign investors may 
have a lower cost of capital, and benefit from risk diversification by including land into their financial 
portfolios. On the other hand, since foreign investors typically rent out acquired land to local 
farmers, returns from farming must pay off the investor as well as the operating farmer. In contrast, 
land rents need not to be shared if operating farmers acquire land, which may lead to a higher 
valuation by this bidder group. In any case, it is difficult to attribute specific (dis)advantages in costs 
and returns of using land clearly to the considered bidder groups because their composition is 
diverse. For example, domestic bidders do not represent solely farmer-owners, but can also involve 
financial investors.  
7 Concluding Remarks 
This study was motivated by the question of whether auctions facilitate policy goals such as a 
“sound” distribution of land property rights, a prevention of dominant market positions, and a 
diversity of legal forms, ownership, and production systems. The current debate across Europe and 
beyond questions that land markets, and in particular auctions, can cope with these issues in a 
satisfactory way and proposes tightening market regulations. Most prominently discussed is 
restricted market access for agents treating land as an investment asset without farming interests, 
so-called non-agricultural or financial investors. Likewise, privileged access to land markets has 
been proposed for small family farms, particularly younger farmers. Using a unique and 
representative data set, we empirically analyze the outcomes of agricultural land auctions in eastern 
Germany and investigate the behavior and the performance of specific bidder groups, which we 
differentiate regarding their legal status, their tenancy status, and their nationality. We apply a 
structural econometric auction model to estimate the distribution of latent land values for these 
bidder groups, and to test for differences in their land valuations between bidder groups. Value 
distributions are derived from the Bayes-Nash equilibrium rationale and can be estimated using 
nonparametric techniques.  
Though earlier studies report that higher transaction prices for agricultural land are realized in 
auctions compared with search markets, we cannot find empirical evidence for the claim that this 
market type discriminates against certain buyer groups in the sense that they are forced out of the 
market or dominated by other bidder types. The 9,781 BVVG land auctions that we analyze are 
won by a diversity of legal forms, by former tenants, as well as non-tenants. Only a small fraction 
of tendered land plots has been sold to foreign bidders. The successful acquisition of land by 
bidders who are not former tenants documents that this group is able to compete with former 
tenants in the market, and that the prevalent property situation is not locked in. Legal entities win 
about 30% of the tendered plots, which may appear large in relation to the total number of farms in 
Eastern Germany. This share, however, is rather low in relation to farm size. The distributions of 
winning bids, after controlling for heterogeneity in land amenities, are quite similar for all pairs of 
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bidder types. Also, the underlying distributions of land valuations, from which bids are derived, do 
not show pronounced differences. This is particularly true when distinguishing between former 
tenants and non-tenants, as well as between foreign and domestic bidders. We conclude that 
foreign investors do not have a different valuation of land than other participants in the agricultural 
land market, despite a different utilization of this asset. In other words, their expectations about 
potential returns from investing in land are similar to other bidders. Thus, in our empirical context, 
foreign investors can hardly be blamed for driving up land prices. Increasing land prices are rather 
the result of fierce competition among all bidder groups, including operating farmers and domestic 
investors. Statistically significant differences in the valuation of land can only be identified if bidders 
are classified into natural persons and legal entities. Higher private values of land for legal entities 
most likely reflect the economic strength of large-scale farms compared to small-scale farms, which 
has already been pointed out by other studies (e.g., Bojnec and Fertő 2013; Woodhouse 2010; 
Hansson 2008; Lissitsa and Odening 2005). In this regard the advantage of non-fragmented land-
use was found to be particularly relevant (e.g., Latruffe and Piet 2014; Curtiss et al. 2013). 
Nonetheless, ascertained differences in the valuation of land between natural persons and legal 
entities remain modest. From this, we conclude that these differences will not entail allocative land 
market inefficiencies. 
Our results are relevant for the current policy debate on land market regulations. First at all, the 
concerns among policy makers in many EU Member States about whether the acquisition of land 
by non-locals and non-farmer crowds farmers out of land markets fosters ownership concentration 
and reduces variety of the farming structure is not supported by our findings. An apparent 
implication is that a tightening of existing market regulations can hardly be justified, at least for the 
considered land market. While many concerns about the land acquisition by large holdings or 
foreign investors are based on case studies or anecdotal evidence, our empirical study refers to a 
comprehensive data set that covers a major segment of the agricultural land market in eastern 
Germany. Our analysis does not reveal economic reasons for not using auctions as an instrument 
for selling or privatizing land. Thus, proposed policy interventions into land markets can only be 
justified by political arguments that go beyond economic efficiency, such as social preferences for 
certain farm types. 
From a methodological perspective, this study contributes to the understanding of price formation 
in land auctions. The micro-structural approach offers the advantage of analyzing the distribution 
of latent valuations behind observed bidding behavior and investigating potential asymmetries 
among bidder groups. Identification of the model, however, relies on the independent private value 
paradigm. While we provide arguments for the plausibility of this assumption, a more formal testing 
of this assumption against the alternative of common values would be desirable. Regarding the 
validity of the implications of our empirical results, we have to acknowledge that we consider only 
one segment of the German land market. For example, land is also auctioned by other state-owned 
land trusts than BVVG. These land trusts offer preferential conditions for local farmers and former 
tenants and it cannot be ruled out that certain bidder types select themselves into particular auction 
formats. Moreover, land acquisition not only takes place on land markets but also through shared 
deals of agricultural cooperatives. This kind of transaction, which we disregard in our analysis, is 
typically linked with financial investors. Finally, the extent to which our empirical findings apply to 
agricultural land markets in other regions with different institutional settings and regulatory 
frameworks is an empirical question that we propose for further research. 
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8 Appendix 
8.1 Details on the Land Auction Data 
Table A1: Number of Observations per Year 











Source: BVVG 2007-2015. 
 
Table A2: Transaction Shares by Group 
 Purged data Raw data 
Group Share on total 
by auction 
Share on total 
by transacted 
hectares 
Share on total 
by auction 
Share on total 
by transacted 
hectares 
Legal entities 31.22% 36.30% 30.08% 34.28% 
Naturals 68.78% 63.70% 66.28% 60.16% 
Non-tenants 72.52% 69.97% 72.52% 69.97% 
Tenants 27.48% 30.03% 27.48% 30.03% 
German buyers 98.98% 98.15% 98.98% 98.15% 
Foreign buyers 1.02% 1.85% 1.02% 1.85% 
Source: BVVG 2007-2015.  
Note: Fractions of raw data may not necessarily sum up to one, as “total” in this instance includes cases of 
missing values, cases with only one bidder, and so on. 
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8.2 Additional Results 
Table A3: Hedonic Regression of Winning Bids, cf. Equation (6) 
 Estimated coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Number of bids 0.021*** 
(0.001) 
Lot characteristics  
Lot size [hectare] 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Average soil quality index 0.006*** 
(0.000) 
Number of parcels -0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Share arable land [0,1] 0.328*** 
(0.006) 
Dummy variables for year  
 2007 -0.056*** 
(0.011) 
 2008 0.020   
(0.010) 
 2009 0.074*** 
(0.009) 
 2010 0.123*** 
(0.010) 
 2011 0.192*** 
(0.009) 
 2012 0.231*** 
(0.010) 
 2013 0.279*** 
(0.010) 
 2014 0.329*** 
(0.009) 
 2015 0.448*** 
(0.012) 
Note: Dependent variable: log winning bids; R2 = 0.919. 
Asterisks *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table A4: Bandwidth Parameter by Group 
Group Bandwidth 




German buyers 0.187 
Foreign buyers 0.402 
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Table A5: Summary Statistics of Homogenized Bids and Estimated Values by Group 




1.098 1.042 0.864 0.428 
Estimated v 1.108 1.055 1.051 0.305 




1.065 0.971 0.848 0.605 




1.094 1.001 0.995 0.607 




1.037 0.974 0.868 0.450 




1.080 1.055 0.792 0.305 




1.004 0.998 1.129 0.478 
Estimated v 1.062 1.061 1.092 0.202 
Source: BVVG 2007-2015. 
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Figure A1: Densities of estimated pseudo-values  
by a) legal form, b) tenancy status and c) foreigner participation 
 
a) Legal form 
 
b) Tenancy status 
 
c) Foreigners involved 
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Figure A2: Cumulative distribution functions of the homogeneous winning bids in €/m²  
by a) legal form, b) tenancy status, and c) foreigner participation 
  
a) By legal form b) By tenancy status 
 
 
c) By foreigner participation  
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